In August and September 2024, thousands of young people took to the streets across Southeast and South Asia in unprecedented displays of protest. This episode examines the youth-led demonstrations that erupted in Indonesia on 25 August and Nepal on 8 September, exploring the deeper frustrations driving Generation Z activism beyond the headlines of violence and regime change. Host Amita Monterola speaks with Garry Rosario da Gama, a PhD student researching corruption networks in Indonesia at the Australian National University's Crawford School of Public Policy, and Puspa Paudel, program manager at the Center for Investigative Journalism in Nepal. Together they discuss how embedded corruption, elite privilege and economic inequality triggered mass protests that resulted in ten deaths in Indonesia and regime change in Nepal, where 72 people died and the country appointed its first female prime minister as a caretaker leader.
In August and September 2024, thousands of young people took to the streets across Southeast and South Asia in unprecedented displays of protest. This episode examines the youth-led demonstrations that erupted in Indonesia on 25 August and Nepal on 8 September, exploring the deeper frustrations driving Generation Z activism beyond the headlines of violence and regime change. Host Amita Monterola speaks with Garry Rosario da Gama, a PhD student researching corruption networks in Indonesia at the Australian National University's Crawford School of Public Policy, and Puspa Paudel, program manager at the Center for Investigative Journalism in Nepal. Together they discuss how embedded corruption, elite privilege and economic inequality triggered mass protests that resulted in ten deaths in Indonesia and regime change in Nepal, where 72 people died and the country appointed its first female prime minister as a caretaker leader.
The conversation begins with the immediate triggers for the protests in each country. In Indonesia, demonstrations erupted after 21-year-old taxi driver Afan Kurnia was killed by a police vehicle, with video of the incident going viral. However, Garry explains that this was a breaking point reflecting deeper frustrations with daily struggles including rising food and fuel costs, stagnant wages, unaffordable housing and lack of formal employment for educated youth. Meanwhile, members of Parliament received housing allowances nearly ten times the minimum wage. The protests spread to 144 of Indonesia's 514 districts, bringing together students, taxi drivers and NGOs in a coalition demanding what became known as the “17 plus 8” reforms — seventeen short-term changes within one week and eight longer-term reforms within one year.
In Nepal, Puspa describes how the protests began through social media, particularly TikTok and Instagram, where videos of politicians' children and family members flaunting extravagant wealth went viral amongst a generation struggling with extreme poverty. One particularly powerful trigger was a video of a parliamentarian's vehicle hitting an 11-year-old girl without stopping. On 8 September, young protesters gathered peacefully at Maitighar in Kathmandu, but when they attempted to reach the parliamentary building, police opened fire. Nineteen young people, many in school uniforms, were shot in the head with live ammunition. The brutality of the response, combined with the Prime Minister's refusal to resign and lack of remorse from government spokespersons, triggered massive nationwide violence on 9 September that saw the burning of government buildings, ministers' homes, police stations, media houses and business premises.
The episode explores the embedded nature of corruption in both countries. Garry's research in Kupang city, Indonesia, reveals how corruption operates through networks connecting contractors, politicians, public servants, law enforcement officials and brokers. Contractors are expected to pay off multiple parties, with only 70-80% of budgets actually going to project work. This explains why roads crumble after one rainy season, clinics run out of medicine and schools lack basic furniture. Indonesians commonly refer to this system as KKN (korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme — corruption, collusion and nepotism), a term enshrined in a 1999 law. The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) was established in 2002, but the government attempted to weaken it in 2019, triggering public anger.
Puspa explains that corruption in Nepal is perceived not merely as a governance issue but as a moral, ethical and political betrayal. Since the 2015 Constitution established Nepal as a federal republic with three tiers of elected government, power has rotated between just three leaders: KP Sharma Oli, Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda”, and Sher Bahadur Deuba. Corruption scandals are routinely used as bargaining chips in coalition negotiations rather than leading to accountability. The Commission for Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA), Nepal's anti-corruption body, has itself become a tool of political parties who nominate loyalists to protect themselves from prosecution. Young people's first encounters with government institutions — obtaining citizenship cards or registering documents — teach them that middlemen and bribes are necessary to navigate systems that should be straightforward.
Both guests discuss the challenges facing watchdog organisations. Garry describes how youth organisations in Kupang, many religion-based, have connections to the very politicians they're meant to criticise. Dependent on government funding for operations, they face pressure from senior politicians to “be more relaxed” and “not push too hard.” Police intimidation compounds these pressures. Puspa notes that whilst individual journalists in Nepal produce excellent investigative reporting on corruption, civil society organisations have failed to pressure government for accountability based on these exposés. Post-2008, older civil society groups lost credibility with younger generations, contributing to the emergence of new, decentralised protest movements.
The episode examines the brutal police responses in both countries. In Indonesia, police are widely regarded as one of the most corrupt government institutions, with research from Murdoch University's Jacqui Baker documenting extensive corruption. Rather than serving as guardians of society, police serve those in power. In Nepal, despite orders to use rubber bullets, commanders authorised live ammunition against protesters, resulting in the incident mentioned above — teenagers in school uniforms being shot in the head, with scenes of this broadcast live across social media.
A striking feature of the September protests was their organisational structure — or lack thereof. Puspa notes that unlike previous protests with clear organisers, leaders and contact points, the 8 September protest in Nepal emerged through social media calls with no identifiable organisers. Young people made “get ready with me” videos about attending protests, practising songs and dances. This decentralised, leaderless structure created confusion in the aftermath when different groups appeared at negotiation tables with no clear mandate. However, Puspa expresses respect for how protesters, through hours of discussion on Discord, managed to negotiate with the Army Chief and President to appoint former Chief Justice Khil Raj Regmi as caretaker Prime Minister — Nepal's first female Prime Minister — while protecting the Constitution and excluding the three established political leaders from negotiations. Elections are planned for March 2025, though the timeframe may prove challenging.
In Indonesia, the protests achieved some immediate reforms including reduced parliamentary housing allowances and presidential calls for police reform. However, Garry argues the most significant outcome was the strengthening of civil society coalitions, with youth organisations, NGOs and student groups coming together under one umbrella to hold government accountable. There was also an important shift in public perception, with citizens recognising that even powerful institutions like the Army and police require reform. Public awareness of embedded corruption has increased significantly.
The conversation reveals multiple barriers to accountability even when corruption is exposed. In Nepal, Puspa explains that policy-level corruption or kleptocracy is designed to look perfectly legal, making it difficult to challenge. Corruption operates through networks rather than isolated individuals, with powerful people and institutions protecting each other. Institutional barriers include compromised anti-corruption bodies, whilst societal barriers include normalised expectations that middlemen and bribes are simply how things work. The weakness of civil society in demanding action based on investigative journalism creates a gap between exposure and accountability. In Indonesia, similar patterns emerge with youth organisations caught between their watchdog role and dependence on government funding, while police and prosecutors are themselves embedded in corruption networks.
Both guests identify these embedded corruption networks as the fundamental driver of youth protest. Despite Indonesia and Nepal being classified as middle-income countries by the World Bank, ordinary citizens see no development gains in their daily lives. Instead, they witness elite families flaunting wealth on social media whilst struggling themselves with poverty, unemployment and crumbling public services. Generation Z, highly active on platforms like TikTok and Instagram, can see the disconnect between official narratives of progress and lived reality with unprecedented clarity. When traditional civil society organisations and anti-corruption institutions fail to deliver accountability, mass street protest becomes the only remaining avenue for demanding change.
The episode concludes by noting that similar youth-led protests have occurred across the region in recent years, including in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Timor-Leste, suggesting these are not isolated incidents but part of a broader pattern of generational frustration with embedded corruption and elite capture of development gains. The Devpolicy blog welcomes submissions analysing these governance challenges across the region.
Nepal resources:
Indonesia resources:
Garry Rosario da Gama: We talk about the military, the police and the army. We expect as a society, we expect them as a guardian of us. They have to be our protector. But in recent years, we can say that they do not serve the society well. They serve those who are in power.
Puspa Paudel: Most of us, I think we could not sleep on that night, and that's how it triggered the other day, because the Prime Minister was not resigning, and then we could not see, we could not hear the remorse in the government spokesperson, and it didn't look like they cared much about this much violence and the death.
-------------------------------------------
Amita Monterola: We wish to acknowledge the Indigenous people of Australia, the wider Asia-Pacific region and other parts of the world, and express our respect for their traditional knowledge and practices, which stem from a deep connection to the lands and waters they have inhabited for millennia.
Welcome to Devpolicy Talks, the podcast of the Development Policy Centre. We're part of the Crawford School of Public Policy here at the Australian National University. I'm Amita Monterola, and in this, our twelfth season, we're bringing you a mix of interviews, event recordings and in-depth features on topics central to our research: Australia's overseas aid, development in Papua New Guinea and the Pacific, and other regional and global development issues.
Today, we're taking a look at why thousands of young people have taken to the streets in Southeast Asia and South Asia in the last two months. In particular, we'll discuss the protests in Indonesia that started on 25 August. Across the country, there were more than 1,000 people taken to hospital, with ten confirmed deaths. 3,195 people were taken into police custody.
We'll also look at what sparked protests in Nepal from 8 September, which resulted in 72 deaths and more than 2,000 people injured. There was widespread destruction of many government offices, physical assault of Cabinet ministers, as well as general looting. But here we're going to go beyond those headlines. So we've invited two guests to discuss what is motivating young people who fail to see the development gains in two nations that the World Bank now classifies as middle-income countries.
Garry Rosario da Gama is a PhD student who's researching corruption networks in Indonesia here at the Crawford School of Public Policy. And from Kathmandu, we're joined by Puspa Paudel, the program manager at the Center for Investigative Journalism, Nepal. Since 1996, the Centre has been training journalists and mentoring them to produce stories to hold authorities to account. Puspa and Garry, welcome to Devpolicy Talks.
Now we're going to take a very quick look at some of the events that triggered the protests in each country, but I would like to encourage everyone who's listening to get a lot more reportage and background from a few different sources that will be included in the show notes. So recently, here at the Australian National University, we had the Indonesia Update event and there was a great presentation that was made by Liam Gammon. So I would really encourage people to look that up on ANU TV YouTube, and we'll put a link to that in our show notes.
I should say that across the Southeast Asian and South Asian regions, we've seen many youth-led protests in the last few years, and we are going to look at two particular countries today. But we should acknowledge that this is certainly not an isolated case, and that there are many situations around the region where there are similar issues faced by countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Timor-Leste.
Garry, first, we'll turn to Indonesia. Could you give us an idea of what led to the current protests that started on 25 August?
Garry Rosario da Gama: Thank you so much, Amita. What happened at the end of August till September this year, I can say this is like a mix of daily struggles and political frustration. People are paying more for food and fuel. Wages are not keeping up, and affordable housing is hard to find, and skilful young generations at higher education are hard to find formal jobs. Meanwhile, you can see members of Parliament receive housing allowances nearly ten times the minimum wage.
And then the breaking point came when a 21-year-old taxi driver, his name is Afan Kurnia, was killed by a police vehicle, and the video of the incident went viral and struck a chord with many people. And protests quickly spread across the country, reaching cities like Jakarta, the capital city, and Surabaya, Makassar and West Java. And then data from the Ministry of Home Affairs mentioned that demonstrations took place in 144 out of 514 districts nationwide.
Amita Monterola: And who were the people that were involved in these protests? Was it just student groups, or were a wider range of people joining in the protests on the street?
Garry Rosario da Gama: More people joined together right now, like the young generation of students, also taxi drivers, the NGOs. They came together to protest with the hope that government will reform.
Amita Monterola: In terms of the protesters' demands, I saw that there was a particular way that the demands were known, the “17 plus 8”. Could you explain that a little bit for us?
Garry Rosario da Gama: You're right. They asked for “17 plus 8” demands, in which 17 demands, it's kind of like a short-term reform, only a week. They asked for 17 reforms within one week, and then the other demands, like eight demands, it is one year reform. They asked the government and the politicians have to change within one year, or do the reforms within one year.
Amita Monterola: So what are some of these examples of things that could be changed in a week, as opposed to ones that might take a little longer?
Garry Rosario da Gama: As I mentioned earlier, the Parliament asked for incentive, housing incentive for ten times compared to the minimum wage. So they asked, please stop. So don't give them ten times the minimum wage. Just give the real market price. And then if you talk about the bigger or the long-term one, which is one year, related to accountability and more fairness to the society.
Amita Monterola: We'll certainly talk more about those demands in a minute. I might just talk about one of the other things that interested me, was that there were parallels with the protesters in Indonesia and Nepal, both targeting well-known politicians. Could you tell us about one of the ways that leaders were attacked during these protests?
Garry Rosario da Gama: So during the protests, some protesters, they even attacked the house of the former Finance Minister Sri Mulyani. For me, it wasn't really about her as a person, but it was what she stood for: a system of privilege and a disconnect from the struggles of ordinary citizens. And then for many, I think it was a way to say that we had reached the limit right now. So now we have to protest and make a movement, and then so the governments, whether the executive as well as the legislative, will change, will reform.
Amita Monterola: In terms of social media, I did read actually just today, that TikTok was, was it formally banned, or was it perhaps the authorities took some action against TikTok? Garry, is that something that was talked about during the protests?
Garry Rosario da Gama: So during the protest, because as you mentioned, Gen Z mostly the protest, or they are [millennials], so they use social media to spread out the news. At that time, the government then stopped live. Those protesters cannot live using their devices.
Amita Monterola: The police were involved in controlling the protests in Jakarta this year. They've had a history of interactions with protesters in the last few years, though. Would you like to tell us a little bit more about that?
Garry Rosario da Gama: Yeah, talk about the military, the police and the army. We expect as a society, we expect them as the guardian of us. They have to be our protector. But in recent years, we can say that they do not serve the society well, but they serve those who are in power. And we can see during the last protest where they killed one of the taxi drivers. So it's like a very sad, very sad story.
And then if you also talk about the current situation in Indonesia, Indonesian police department is also considered as the corrupt institution among the country, between the other departments. And one of the research from Murdoch University, Jacqui Baker, she writes about police department corruption. And then, yeah, we can from her journal articles, or from her published articles, we can read that police department are very corrupt compared to the other departments.
Amita Monterola: Okay, so in the Indonesian case, it's not just that they were controlling the protests, but the institution of the police had a history of corruption as well. This might be a good point where I can bring in Puspa now to talk about Kathmandu and how the police did put down the protests again on 8 September. Would you like to tell us a little bit about how they started there?
Puspa Paudel: There were a lot of videos going on in social media, especially in Instagram, in TikTok and other social media as well, where the new generation, how they use the social media, there would be like just posts, videos where politicians' sons or the close ones would flaunt their wealth, whilst the people who are living in extreme poverty, they didn't have, they didn't get to fulfil their basic needs. So this kind of videos, especially, were circulating in the social media, and some of the popular faces, like for example, I will just give an example of former Miss Nepal, who happened to be a daughter of one of the former parliamentarians. This kind of triggered the young crowd, and they were calling for the protest on September 8.
They were calling it like a peaceful protest, and they were coming. I could see that the young people were making videos on things like, get ready with me to go on a protest. And then they were like practising the songs and dances. And I think one person would tell their friend to come in the protest, and the reason they gave is these videos and all were like politicians and their families were like enjoying the extravagant life where the poor people and the other half of, more than half of the population were living in entire poverty. And I think that connected them well, this generation.
And then also on 4 September, there was like the ban on social media. And then, although most of the people are referring this as the cause, but it is not like that. It's just a tipping point and all. I would also like to remember this one incident on 6 September where a parliamentarian hit a young girl, an 11-year-old girl, and it was viral over the social media, and that the vehicle didn't even stop. And then that, I think that triggered, because the visual thing is very powerful for this generation, for us too.
And then there was calling for the protest on 8 September, and this added up, and a lot of young people showed up on 8 September, and it was very peaceful. So some of the protesters were already gathered by 9am at Maitighar, where a lot of protests happen. This is the particular place. And from there, it just takes seven to eight minutes to reach the parliamentarian building. And most of the protests happened in this place. And so the young protesters also called themselves to gather in this place.
There were police in the barricades, and these young protesters were there. And some of them were not trying to, like, break the barricade and all. But then, you know, in a protest, in a mass, there is no control of anyone. There were, you know, there were triggers and things like that, where they eventually tried to, like, break those barricades and then reach towards the parliamentarian house. And by, I think, one or 2pm there was like shooting by the police. And it was very brutal. Like you can see that live on, live on the street, live on, you know, in all over the social media. TikTok was there, and the other social media also. And it triggered us, because they were very young, very young protesters, and they were in school uniform, and they were shot in the head. And it triggered most of us. I think we could not sleep that night, and that's how it triggered the other day, because the Prime Minister was not resigning, and then we could not see, we could not hear the remorse in the spokesperson, government spokesperson, and it was very, it didn't look like they cared much about this much violence and the death.
Amita Monterola: I believe that the police were told to use rubber bullets, but there was then a command to use live ammunition. The reports that 19 young people were killed were obviously the trigger to more violence. There were many protests all over the country at that stage, and there were many people who were taking action in all sorts of ways. But could you just tell us a little bit about how the politicians were targeted in Kathmandu, and then we'll look at some of the concessions that were made by the government a little bit later in the podcast.
Puspa Paudel: On the day of 9 September, there was like a massive gathering from each and every corner. And I think it was all over Nepal, not only at cities. It was also at villages as well. And the Prime Minister was not resigning, and there were a lot of people going towards the parliamentary house because it became the symbol of the violence. Even though there was curfew, the protesters gathered and calling on social media to go towards the parliamentarian house.
And by, I think, one, between one to 1.30pm, the protesters were inside the parliamentarian house, and it was burned down. And it followed like the Prime Minister's, the then Prime Minister's house, and a number of protesters went to the Minister's quarters and then started burning. And these were all in the social, all over the social media. And then even if, even after the Prime Minister resigned, so it was not stopped.
And then it went to all three institutions of government, like judiciary, executive and legislative. All three houses, like the symbol of government institution, all were burned. And it also, the protesters also burned down the media house, like one of the largest media houses, and also the businesspersons, like Bhat Bhateni is a supermarket chain, and some of those stores were burned down. And police stations, like police stations were also the targets. Many of the police stations were destroyed, and I don't think these buildings can be reused. And also car showrooms, and then the personal houses of the ministers, former ministers, parliamentarians. Many parliamentarians were targeted.
Amita Monterola: So a little bit of a background on the politicians in Nepal. In the past few decades, since Nepal has held free and fair elections and been able to elect a Parliament that has been representative of the power, the people, even in that case, there has been a very small amount of people that have taken power. Could you just describe those people who've been sharing power at the top, in particular the current Prime Minister and the past Prime Ministers?
Puspa Paudel: Yeah, after this new Constitution was introduced in September 2015, it is like ten-year anniversary of our Constitution. So during this time, you know, Nepal have had the system of government where we had like monarchy and all. It was abolished, and then we were declared federal republic. And then, after 2015 Constitution, we finally had three tiers of government where all the tiers had elected representatives.
But what it looks like is that the three Prime Ministers, I would say, this is KP Sharma Oli, Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda”, and Sher Bahadur Deuba. They were all, the power centred around these three, these three leaders only. And even though at the local government level, at the ward level, we are the people who elected them. They're very close to us and all. But the frustration with these three leaders triggered down to the local level as well. And in that heat, even the, I heard that some of the ward chairs' houses were also burned down. So I think people associated corruption, not only with these leaders, but also to the party and the people associated with these political parties. So I think that triggered all these violence on 9 September.
Amita Monterola: Okay, we might leave it there on the actual protests themselves, and look at some of the underlying issues of corruption that we're talking about here. Garry, I might bring you in here to talk a little bit about some of your research and how you've looked at these embedded forms of corruption in Indonesia. Could you tell us a little bit about how the ordinary person on the street views corruption in Indonesia?
Garry Rosario da Gama: We often talk about KKN [korupsi, kolusi dan nepotisme], that is corruption, collusion and nepotism, as defined in Law Number 28 of 1999 on the Administration of a State that is Clean and Free from Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism. So every citizen, we know that KKN, or corruption, collusion and nepotism. And we can understand this from the law. But talk about the embeddedness of corruption. It's not just talking about one particular actor, but it's become the whole game that is played.
And in my own research, I research about how corruption networks, they influence budget allocations, projects and project implementation at the local level. And in my research, I found that if you are a contractor in Kupang City, the place that I did my research, it's almost expected that you will have to pay off multiple people, such as the mayor, the local Parliament members, public servants also. You also need to pay law enforcement officials and also the brokers.
By the time the money actually filters down, maybe only 70% or 80% is left for doing the real work. Or if you can see that after one rainy season comes, the roads will be disappeared or getting broken, and the clinics also run out of medicine. And then you can see the schools without the windows or without tables and chairs. So this situation is happening, also experienced by ordinary citizens in Indonesia in their daily life.
Amita Monterola: So in terms of anti-corruption efforts, what has been the history of that in the public sphere?
Garry Rosario da Gama: In the public sphere, we're really lucky enough to have Corruption Eradication Commission, or KPK [Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi], since 2002. But there was an event in 2019 in which the country, the government, tried to reduce the roles or the power of the Corruption Eradication Commission itself. The public got angry.
But talking about the grassroots movement, we have NGOs, we have youth organisations. They work together to watch what governments do.
In the place that I did my research, which is in Kupang City, most of those who sit in power, mostly they are Catholics or they are Protestants, and then most of the youth organisations, they are also religion-based, and then they have connection to those who are in power, whether they are mayor or whether they are Parliament members. Because they have the connection, and then they don't have money for their daily operational. So they, yeah, as a youth organisation, they are expected to criticise the government. But at the same time, they also need money which usually comes from their seniors who are in power in the government, and they will get government intervention, and then their seniors will ask, could you please try to be more relaxed, don't push us too hard, or don't criticise too much, and so on and so forth. And they also, the youth organisations, when I interview them, they mentioned that they also get intimidated by the law enforcement, especially the police officers.
Amita Monterola: So you're saying that those social and community links that make them good watchdogs are also setting up barriers to either their longevity or their sustainability or their effectiveness in terms of calling out the corruption at the local level?
Garry Rosario da Gama: Yeah, you're right, yeah. And as I said earlier, because it is supposed to be a good watchdog, and then the society also expect them to be a good watchdog and criticise the government when the government is doing something bad. They are expected to do more protests, and then ask government to do the right things. But as I also mentioned earlier that they also kind of depend on the government, kind of like donation through the government intervention, so they not really play their role so effectively.
Amita Monterola: Could you just elaborate on the role of the police at that local level? What kind of stories have you found in your field research that relate to police and anti-corruption efforts?
Garry Rosario da Gama: My research is about corruption networks. And sad to say that police department, as well as the prosecutors, they themselves are involved in the corruption networks because they have connection to the contractors. And because usually, if you talk about the corruption in government side, usually related to procurement. And youth organisations, if they see, oh, this road, why is this road easily broken because it's only just a small raining, why it's broken? So they expect, they suspected that there is corruption there, and then they do protest because of these kind of things happen.
But as I mentioned earlier that the police department, police officers, they also involve themselves. They have connection with the contractors who run the project, the road project. Yeah, because the youth organisation, they criticise this. They will be called by the police. Police officers come to the police office, and then they will get intimidated. And yeah, it's very hard for them, because on one side they want to be very critical to the government, but on the other side, they also get intimidated as well as they also need government funding.
Amita Monterola: We might switch back to talking about Nepal and some of the corruption networks there, because I can see that Puspa is nodding her head along with your comments, Garry. And in her work as well with the Center for Investigative Journalism, I'm sure that she has some reflections on the embedded nature of these networks. So I might just ask you first, Puspa, about the way that the public views corruption in Nepal.
Puspa Paudel: When I read about the history of Nepal, this political systems and all in Nepal, like I always get through the readings where they have mentioned that the corruption has increased. Corruption is not only framed as a governance issue, but it is also a moral and ethical and political betrayal. I think that is what people perceive corruption as. And even when, as I shared earlier, when this corruption, like big corruption scandals, are out, these are only taken as bargain for this coalition, the coalition government. If someone is in power, then you take out, you dig out the corruption files, and then it is used as the bargain between these parties.
So and in another way, like this young generation, I can give you an example. The young generation, their approach to this government institution, that may be the first one may be their ward. Like we have a municipality where there are different wards, and they go, for example, to make a citizenship card, or they register themselves. That is when I think they get sense of how the system is not facilitative and it always requires a middle person. And it is ingrained; it has been ingrained in such a way that you think that you need to have some person and give them some money so that they will facilitate all this institutional process that is associated with government.
I would also like to add, when Garry was saying about this, you know, government efforts of anti-corruption and all, I was relating it to the Commission for Investigation of Abuse of Authority, that we call CIAA in abbreviation. And this is the institution which is supposed to do all this investigation and recommend the government to punish the people who are corrupt. But this commission has also been in the centre of the bargaining for the political parties where they would nominate someone from their own circles so that they would not face these corruption charges and all. So when Garry was saying that, I was clearly remembering the CIAA, which was also burned in this protest.
Amita Monterola: Could you tell us a little bit about the new generation, particularly in your industry, in the media? Before the new Constitution, perhaps, were there a network of journalists that were working to uncover corruption? Or is this a new cohort of people?
Puspa Paudel: There are journalists who are very much into investigating the corruption and anti-corruption reporting and all. And I don't think there is an organised group, but they do come together when they have to get the stories out. And regarding the young journalists, I think the situation of media in Nepal, especially post-COVID, I think seen elsewhere in the world, the media houses are themselves in the struggle. And in name of those struggles, the journalists have been facing a lot of hardships, and they are not paid well even.
And the reason behind this recent, the one of the largest media houses in the country was also, the office was burned down, and it was also because there were a lot of issue of non-payment. And I would say there's a kind of gap between how this media houses and the journalists, I would say, a bit older journalists, journalists who were breaking the stories of corruption and all, maybe they were not able to reach out to the young crowds as such. But there has been like brilliant work of journalists.
One thing I would agree with you is that even if these stories like break out in the mainstream newspaper and all, they have, especially on part of journalists, I think their part is to break out the stories, and then the pressuring the government and all these things is the part of civil society, which is another part of the corruption, where the young people are not believing in the older civil society forms and groups. And they were referring them; the older civil society groups and all those things were not able to question the government on the stories of the corruption that were like brought about by the journalists.
Amita Monterola: I'd like to talk about those barriers. So the stories that have been brought to light and where people, either the perhaps the journalists themselves, have been able to show systematic corruption or follow the money trail to find out where the money has actually been spent or been given. What are the barriers to those next steps, such as prosecution or the politician being removed from politics?
Puspa Paudel: The first thing is, it seems like everything has been done properly. And then that is what policy-level corruption or kleptocracy looks like. It looks like everything is perfect, and you cannot question the things like that. And even within that, even if the story is out that these are the things where the policy-level corruptions have been done, the barriers are obviously, like, the first one is all the institutions would be involved in that. Like one or the other government institution, there would be involvement.
The corruption, I think, does not happen in isolation or in the individual. For example, an individual in a public office would take bribes or anything. It does not happen in isolation. It is the nexus. It is the network. So one barrier is that, because most of the powerful people and the institutions are there in together, in that nexus. And the other barrier is that, as I said earlier, if we look into the context of civil society, after 2008 in Nepal, civil society has not been able to voice this demand, the actions or the things like that. That's why I think the different form of protest and civil society emerged in recent years, like in the protest in September.
These are the, I think, barriers. And also one of the barriers, I would say that the mindset has been, our mindset has been formed like this. This is the part of everyday life. This has been part of our everyday life. And we want to deal with, okay, we are very like fast-moving in our own lives, and we want to do things faster. And then we'll also accept the middle person as the way that it is. So I think the barriers are like institutional barriers, our mindsets, and then civil society not being so active and asking accountability. So yes, so there's multiple barriers there.
Amita Monterola: And it does sound like there are certainly parallels between the situation in Nepal and Indonesia with these networks of embedded corruption. And it's no surprise that Generation Z is seeing that the problem is very overwhelming, and that they can only take action through a mass movement such as protest in the street.
Puspa Paudel: So one thing I noticed in our protest here was the use of the word “organise”. So in the social media, in the videos that I have collected or the call for the protest, there was the call for the protest and there was no organiser. There were no organisers. I didn't see anything. Let's organise a protest. And that was not the narrative that was formed earlier in the past when we had protests and things like that. There was always something that organised this, some people or some institution or some groups that would organise this, and then we would know whom to contact. There will be leaders and things like that.
In this protest, particularly in the 8 September protest, I didn't see the use of the word “organise”. There was call for protest, and everyone was called in through social media and everywhere, to Maitighar, and they were calling out the government rather than organised. That's why after the aftermath of protest, we saw that the different groups that were in negotiation table, and there was confusion and chaos. And I know every protest, aftermath of every protest or the revolution has this kind of thing. But in this one, we see a new pattern in terms of who takes the ownership or who's the leader. There was a lot of confusion. And I don't know, I think this was the nature of protest elsewhere in the Asian countries.
Amita Monterola: Recently, as you say, it may be a new trend in Generation Z protests that the organising group is a very loose collection of people. But in the Nepal example, they did affect massive change to the government of Nepal. I understand that some of the Generation Z representatives met with the Nepal Army Chief, Ashok Raj Sigdel, and also they brought in the President Ram Chandra Paudel. So could you tell us a little bit about what they achieved in these really, a really short period of time that they were protesting?
Puspa Paudel: I think this would be a very interesting, you know, regime change in the history of Nepal, and I don't know, maybe elsewhere for the world. On the day of 9 September, the Prime Minister resigned, and then there were like massive vandalism happening, burning down and everything. And by 6pm, there was like a notice from the Army that they asked everyone to be calm and things like that. And at 9pm only, there was like the notice issued by Nepal Army, and there was a video address from the Army Chief.
You know, I really have a massive respect to the generation, the leaders, in terms of how they still had President on the talk table. But also there was an interesting thing, was there was a discussion going on for hours, hours on Discord. It was really interesting to hear for us, because they were discussing about who should be the next leader and why they should be the leader, and a lot of confusion on why there should be President still there, and why the Constitution still holds its right and things.
And within these negotiations, they brought about the leader, which is the former Chief Justice. And I think they negotiated this way that they could protect the Constitution. They don't want this major political party leaders, the faces they were seeing, to be in the negotiation table.
Amita Monterola: So it was actually a caretaker Prime Minister that was appointed and she's actually the first female Prime Minister in Nepal, which is like a whole other discussion that I'll have to do another podcast on.
But she did have a track record in anti-corruption reform. She is going to be the leader who is going to take the country forward to the next general election.
Puspa Paudel: Yes, is perceived as an anti-corruption leader, and I think that has been brought attention to many young generation people. So I think these negotiators on the table found a way where they can have a person who has a good image of anti-corruption, and then choose a leader likewise. But also protecting the Constitution. And then seeing that the leader will make a good way into elections.
Amita Monterola: Currently, the election is going to be planned for March. Of course, we don't know if that's too short a time-period to prepare the country for those elections.
Turning to Indonesia, I'm interested to hear from you, Garry, about whether you think that the protests there have resulted in similar outcomes, whether there are any anti-corruption figures that are perhaps either gaining a new platform or some form of power. Or yeah, whether you have another view of the outcomes there.
Garry Rosario da Gama: Thank you so much, Amita. After the massive protests in September, at the end of August and September, early September 2024, as we talk about the “17 plus 8” demands, I can say that in some assured that some of the short demands have already been achieved. Let's say the government right now, they're lowering the housing incentive for the Parliament. And also the President asked for reform in police department, because we talk about the police right now is not becoming the guardian for the civil society, but mostly they are defenders for the elite. And then.
But the unintended outcomes that I want to highlight is right now, there's a change of the perception through to the Army and police department that is strong and powerful, because right now, people know that these institutions also need to be reformed. And then the President also reacted quite fast in order to, and he asked for reform for this institution. And the other thing is, for me, the increase of public awareness of corruption issues, because it's really important and it's embedded, and we need massive reform for that. And then all the society, civil society organisations, the youth organisations, they now become, come together under one umbrella in order to criticise the government. So for me, it's a good achievement that we achieve from this event.
Amita Monterola: That's a really interesting observation that in Indonesia, perhaps the mobilisation of civil society organisations has been the outcome, rather than the change of government. And we heard from Puspa earlier that perhaps to have long-term change in Nepal that civil society does need to step up there as well. I think that's a great place to leave our discussion.
Today, we've started the discussion of the underlying issues that fuelled the protests sweeping through the Asian region. We hope to continue the dialogue here on Devpolicy Talks, and also the Devpolicy blog, which I co-produce with Robin Davies. We've run a number of blogs on governance in Bangladesh, Indonesia and Nepal. We'd also welcome submissions on Timor-Leste, Sri Lanka and other nations that are experiencing challenges, in addition to our regular call for analysis of global development issues. You can find the submission guidelines at devpolicy.org.
I'd like to thank our guests today. Garry Rosario da Gama is a PhD student who's researching corruption networks in Indonesia here at the Crawford School of Public Policy at the Australian National University. And in Kathmandu, we were joined by Puspa Paudel, the program manager at the Center for Investigative Journalism Nepal. You can read published stories on corruption, kleptocracy and misuse of public funds at cijnepal.org.
We look forward to joining you in another fortnight on Devpolicy Talks.
Amita Monterola: Devpolicy Talks is the podcast of the Australian National University's Development Policy Centre. Show notes are posted to Simplecast. Our producers are Robin Davies, Amita Monterola and Finn Clark. You can read and subscribe to our daily blogs on aid, international development and the Pacific at devpolicy.org, and you can follow us on Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram and Twitter. You can send us feedback and ideas for episodes to devpolicy@anu.edu.au. Join us again in another fortnight for the next episode of DevPolicy Talks.